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Abstract
Equity considerationsplay an important role in international climate negotiations.While policy analysis
has often focused on equity as it relates tomitigation costs, there are large regional differences in
adaptation costs and the level of residual damage.This paper illustrates the relevance of including
adaptation and residual damage in equity considerations by determininghow the allocation of emission
allowanceswould change to counteract regional differences in total climate costs, deﬁned as the costs of
mitigation, adaptation, and residual damage.We compare emission levels resulting froma global carbon
taxwith two allocations of emission allowances under a global cap-and-trade system: one equating
mitigation costs and one equating total climate costs as share ofGDP.To account for uncertainties in
bothmitigation and adaptation,weuse amodel-comparison approach employing two alternative
modeling frameworkswith different damage, adaptation cost, andmitigation cost estimates, and look at
twodifferent climate goals.Despite the identiﬁedmodel uncertainties, wederive unambiguous results
on the change in emission allowance allocation that could lessen the unequal distributionof adaptation
costs and residual damages through theﬁnancial transfers associatedwith emission trading.
1. Introduction
The recent Paris Agreement forms an important step
forward in international climate policy. In evaluating
climate policy in general and the Paris Agreement in
particular, most analyses focus on mitigation, such as
the national determined climate pledges and the long-
term temperature target. The Paris Agreement, how-
ever, also includes an adaptation goal. The two goals
are connected by the focus on limiting global average
temperature change well below 2 °C. Climate policy is
complex not only because of difﬁculties of reaching
stringent mitigation targets but also because of the
difﬁculty of reconciling regional efforts with the
inequality of climate change impacts. This is even
more important since the current pledges are not in
line with the 2 °C target, implying a serious risk of
higher global warming and thus of higher climate
impacts. It is therefore interesting to consider the
fairness of international climate policy by looking not
only at mitigation costs as usually done, but also at the
costs of adaptation and residual damages. Given the
unequal distribution of the costs of mitigation
policies, climate impacts, as well as of adaptation costs,
when deﬁning equitable policies it is imperative to
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uncertainty. A global cap-and-trade regime could
compensate countries with high adaptation costs and
damages by allocating emission allowances in such a
way that trading of emission allowances would lead to
ﬁnancial transfers that counteract the unequal distri-
bution of adaptation costs and residual damage (Hof
et al 2010, De Cian and Tavoni 2012, Tavoni
et al 2013, 2015). While such a scheme is somewhat
theoretical, it provides a useful analytical framework
for evaluating real-world climate policies.
There are only few existing studies that have ana-
lyzed emission allowance allocation schemes in which
mitigation costs, adaptation costs, and residual dama-
ges are all considered. These studies all relied on a sin-
gle model (Hof et al 2010, Pattanayak and Kavi
Kumar 2014). Yet, the elements involved when exam-
ining the balance of different regional costs, i.e. miti-
gation costs, adaptation costs, and damage estimates,
are all very uncertain and thus model-dependent. It is
important for policy-makers and analysts to consider
these uncertainties when designing policy strategies
that hold under a range of models’ speciﬁcations and
mitigation goals. Multi-model Intercomparison Pro-
jects (MIPs) are used to take into account key model
uncertainties (Clarke et al 2009, Luderer et al 2012,
Blanford et al 2014, Kriegler et al 2015, Tavoni
et al 2015), but so-farMIP assessments of equitable cli-
mate policies have focused only on the distribution of
mitigation costs (den Elzen and Höhne 2008, den
Elzen and Höhne 2010, Ekholm et al 2010, Luderer
et al 2012, Tavoni et al 2015). It seems that the paucity
of regional damage and adaptation cost estimates, and
of Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) taking into
account these estimates, has prevented MIP exercises
to explore how uncertainties in climate impact and
adaptation cost estimates could affect policy conclu-
sions regarding effort-sharing schemes.
This paper aims at ﬁlling this gap.We illustrate the
relevance of including adaptation and residual damage
in equity considerations by determining how emission
allowances in a global cap-and-trade regime would be
allocated to countervail the regional differences in
adaptation costs and residual damage as compared to
an allocation of allowances which only counteracts
differences in mitigation costs. In order to identify key
factors determining the outcome of such a broader
equity view, we employ two different IAMs (a simula-
tion and an optimization model), two sets of damage
and adaptation cost curves, as well as two different
long-term climate goals.
First, we evaluate the residual damages and adapta-
tion costs for two long-term global average temperature
change levels (2 °C and 3 °C by the end of the century).
We thenmap the distribution ofmitigation effort on the
one hand and damages and adaptation costs on the
other hand to give an overview of how these aspects will
qualitatively affect the change in allocation of allowan-
ces. We then use our modeling frameworks to quantify
the change in emission allowance allocation if total
climate costs (costs of mitigation, adaptation, and resi-
dual damage)were to be equalized, assuming allowances
canbe traded freely in a global cap-and-trade scheme.
2.Methods
For our analysis we use FAIR (Hof et al 2010, den Elzen
et al 2014) and WITCH (Bosetti et al 2006, De Cian
et al 2012), two widely used global IAMs. Both models
describe the interactions between energy, land use,
climate change, and the economy. They both use
aggregate adaptation cost curves and simple damage
functions that relate globalmean temperature increase
above pre-industrial levels to change in regional
economic production (GDP).
Despite the lively debate about climate change
damage functions and how they relate to integrated
assessment (Dell et al 2012, Dell et al 2014, Burke
et al 2015), only a few studies have gathered regional,
sectorial data on climate impacts and adaptation costs
at global scale, and used them to integrate the costs and
beneﬁts of adaptation in IAMs (de Bruin et al 2009,
Agrawala et al 2010, 2011). In order to explore how
considerations on equitable emission allowance allo-
cations depend on damage and adaptation cost esti-
mates, here we update the set of damage and
adaptation cost functions used in the WITCH model,
and compare it to the FAIR model, which utilizes the
damage and adaptation estimates provided by de
Bruin et al (2009). The damage curves of de Bruin et al
(2009) are based on Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). Esti-
mates of adaptation costs have been used to separate
adaptation costs and residual damages, as described in
detail in the supplementary information (SI), available
at stacks.iop.org/ERL/11/0740157.
The damage functions implemented in the
WITCH model are based on sectorial climate impact
estimates developed in the ClimateCost project8 (Wat-
kiss 2011, Bosello and De Cian 2014) and integrated
with Nordhaus (2007) estimates for the impact cate-
gories health and catastrophic events. For the category
settlements and ecosystems, new estimates are com-
puted using a Willingness-To-Pay approach. Details
are provided in the SI. The updated impact estimates
for the categories coastal, health, catastrophic, settle-
ments and ecosystems are for most regions larger than
those reported in Agrawala et al (2010, 2011; table S5).
Adaptation cost estimates have been developed by
adjusting Agrawala et al (2010, 2011) data to the
impact categories considered in this study.
Both FAIR andWITCH calculate the optimal level
of adaptation, i.e. the level at which the marginal costs
of adaptation equalizes the marginal beneﬁts of redu-
cing damage. WITCH and FAIR make different
7
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assumptions with respect to adaptation costs and
effectiveness. FAIR (see de Bruin et al 2009, Hof
et al 2010) groups together the cost estimates of var-
ious forms of adaptation into one aggregate adaptation
variable, assuming that costs and beneﬁts fall into the
same time period (see section SI1, equations (1)–(2)).
WITCH (Agrawala et al 2011, Bosello et al 2013) dis-
tinguishes between three types of adaptation strate-
gies, proactive, reactive, and adaptive capacity, which
are combined together to reduce climate impacts (see
section SI1, equations (3)–(9)). Increasing adaptive
capacity, for example by fostering education, does not
reduce the damage directly, but facilitates adaptation
activities and improves their effectiveness. Reactive
adaptation describes actions that are implemented
when or right after climatic impacts effectively occur,
such as adjusting energy demand for cooling. Antici-
patory adaptation, such as building dikes, describes
the effect of a stock of defensive capital being opera-
tional before the damage materializes, and remaining
effective against damages over time.
WITCHandFAIR representmitigation optionswith
a different level of detail, and differences with respect to
the economic, technological and sectorial representation
are discussed in Kriegler et al (2013). FAIR calculates the
allocation of abatement across regions by means of
dynamic and path-dependent marginal abatement cost
curves, which differ across regions and are based on the
global energy model IMAGE/TIMER (van Vuuren
et al 2014) to which IMAGE is connected. WITCH is an
inter-temporal general equilibrium model that embeds
the energy sector in a growth model. As a consequence,
the two models differ considerably in the estimates of
mitigationpotential and costs.
The climate policy scenarios considered in this
paper explore two emission reduction pathways posing
different challenges for adaptation (tables 1 and S12).
The more stringent policy case leads to a radiative for-
cing of 2.8Wm−2 in 2100, which yields a likely chance
of reaching the 2 °C target as projected by theMAGICC
climate model (similar to the LIMITS scenarios descri-
bed by Tavoni et al 2013, 2015). In the less ambitious
policy, radiative forcing reaches 4.5Wm−2 in 2100,
yielding a likely chance of reaching the 3 °C target. We
refer to these scenarios as 2 °C and 3 °C, respectively.
Prior to 2020, we assume that regions implement pre-
sent and planned climate-related policies and regula-
tions, which include a collection of national emission
targets, greenhouse gas emission (GHG) intensity
reduction targets, nuclear power and renewable energy
targets (Kriegler et al 2013). Globally coordinated miti-
gation starts immediately after 2020, when a global car-
bonmarket is also assumed to be fully operational. Two
baseline scenarios without mitigation policies analyze
the extent of climate damages and adaptation costs in
the absence of climate policy targets, and are used as
reference to computemitigation costs.
In the ﬁrst two mitigation scenarios (a and b), the
long-term temperature target is reached in a global
cost-optimal way by means of a global tax (global tax
regime in table 1). In each regionmitigation is ﬁnanced
domestically and there is no international compensa-
tion scheme or carbon emission trading. These scenar-
ios are compared to a set of effort sharing schemes
(scenarios c and d), in which emission allowances are
distributed in such a way that emission trading under a
global cap-and-trade system equalizes mitigation costs
(scenario c) or total climate change costs (scenario d) as
share of GDP across regions and over time. Both sce-
narios (c) and (d) are basedon the horizontal equity rule
(Rose et al 1998). Scenario (c) equalizes regionalmitiga-
tion costs (TMCi,t) as a share ofGDP (Yi,t):
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Table 1. Summary of baseline and policy scenarios.
Scenarios Climate target
Baseline scenarios
Without adaptation Business AsUsual (BAU)
With adaptation Business AsUsual (BAUwAdap)
Policy scenarios 3 °C (4.5 W m−2) 2 °C (2.8 W m−2)
Global tax regime
Without adaptation (a) 3 °C-Tax 2 °C-Tax
With adaptation (b) 3 °C-Taxw/Adap 2 °C-Taxw/Adap
Effort sharing regime
Allocation equalizingmitigation costs without adaptation (c) 3 °C-EqMitCosts 2 °C-EqMitCosts
Allocation equalizing total costs with adaptation (d) 3 °C-EqFullCosts w/Adap 2 °C-EqFullCosts w/Adap
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where ai is the emission allocation to country i at time
t, and N is the number of regions in the model (on
regional aggregates see table S11).
3. Results
We begin by exploring the distributional conse-
quences in baseline and policy scenarios under global
tax regimes, and subsequently explore ways to com-
pensate regions and achieve higher equity.
3.1. Projecting the distribution of residual damage
and adaptation costs
According to both FAIR and WITCH results, limiting
global warming to 2 °C approximately halves the
global economic damages associated with climate
change throughout this century compared to baseline,
both with and without adaptation (ﬁgure 1). Yet, it
should also be noted that the estimated global impacts
remain above 1% of the projected Global World
Product (GWP) in most cases. Without adaptation,
the projected global economic damage varies from
2.4%–2.7% in the baseline, to 1.5%–2.2% in the 3 °C
scenario, and 1%–1.6% in the 2 °C scenario. Adapta-
tion reduces global residual damage signiﬁcantly and
especially at higher temperatures. Adding adaptation
costs provides the following total projected costs of
damage and adaptation: 1.5%–2.1% in the baseline,
between 1.1%–1.8% for 3 °C, and 0.8%–1.4%
for 2 °C.
Figure 1 shows the global as well as the regional
costs for the BAU, 3 °C, and 2 °C scenarios. The chart
highlights strong regional disparities, which remain
even in the low mitigation scenarios. This is particu-
larly the case in India, Africa, and Rest of Asia (South
East Asia and Indonesia region, table S11), where the
climate change impacts associated with a 2 °C warmer
climate can be as high as 3%–4% without adaptation,
and 2%–3% if adaptation is implemented. Based on
the two sets of models and their cost estimates, China
appears to suffer the least (in net) from climate change,
as agriculture in China is assumed to beneﬁt from cli-
mate change. Furthermore, de Bruin et al (2009)
damage functions assume that climate change could
lead to beneﬁts in leisure activities (see SI). In the
South East Asia and Indonesia regions adaptation
reduces damages signiﬁcantly according to the FAIR
model, which assumes adaptation measures dealing
with health, coastal, and agricultural impacts are more
effective thanWITCH (tables S6, S7). In Europe, adap-
tation measures to cope with climate change impacts
on coastal areas, settlements, and infrastructure are
assumed to lower residual damages considerably,
especially in the FAIR model. FAIR and WITCH rely
on different impact models for the assessment of
coastal impacts and adaptation, and assume different
protection levels in the areas of settlements and eco-
systems adaptation, with FAIR being more optimistic
than WITCH (see tables S3, S6, S7). Figure 1 provides
clear evidence that the distribution of damages and
adaptation costs will remain profoundly unequal irre-
spective of the stringency of the mitigation effort and
the possibility of adapting to climate change.
3.2.Mapping the distribution of effort
The unequal distribution of residual damages and
adaptation costs outlined in ﬁgure 1 has repercussions
for the analysis of equitable climate policies, as the
distribution of damages and adaptation costs does not
necessarily match that of mitigation costs. Figure 2
provides a regional mapping ofmitigation costs on the
horizontal axis and of adaptation costs plus residual
impacts on the vertical axis when the climate target is
achieved via the global tax regime without inter-
regional transfers. The four quadrants (I,II,II,IV)
identiﬁed by the horizontal and vertical dashed lines
show cases in which regions pay more or less than the
global average for either mitigating climate change
and/or adaptation/residual impacts.
Despite model differences, some clear results
emerge. The industrialized countries (OECD
Figure 1.Residual damages and adaptation costs inNet Present Value (2005–2100, 3%discount factor). RESTASIA: South East Asia
and Indonesia regions. PAC_OECD:Canada, Japan and inWITCHNewZealand. REST_WORLD: SouthKorea, SouthAfrica,
Australia, NorthKorea and in FAIRNewZealand. REF_ECON:Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Kazakhstan region.
NORTH_AM:United States. INDIA+: India and SouthAsia.
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countries, Europe, North America, Paciﬁc OECD, and
Rest of the World) are clustered in quadrant III. Both
theirmitigation costs as well as climate change impacts
are lower than the world average. Some of the world’s
poorest regions (Africa, Rest of Asia, India) are clus-
tered in quadrant I, with both relatively high climate
change impacts as well as mitigation costs under the
2 °C target. Regions in or close to quadrant IV (the
energy exporting regions Middle East and Transition
Economies) are projected to have relatively high miti-
gation costs, with a large range across the two models,
and impacts close to the world average. Latin America
is close to the global average both with respect to miti-
gation costs and impacts. China appears to have some-
what higher than average mitigation costs under both
mitigation scenarios, but lower than average impacts.
Figure 2 corroborates the regional disparity of
mitigation costs highlighted in Stern et al (2012) and
Tavoni et al (2013, 2015). The additional key insight is
that including residual damages and adaptation costs
further exacerbates the distributional consequences of
a policy based on a global tax regime. For most
regions, the collocation of regions with respect to
either dimensions holds for both 2 °C and 3 °C across
models, although the grouping into four clusters is
somewhat clearer under themore stringent policy.
3.3. Emission allowance allocation andﬁnancial
transfers to equalize effort
Given the climate change cost disparities presented in
ﬁgure 2, we analyze the emission allowance allocation
scheme that could equalize the total climate costs per
unit of GDP across regions. First, we determine the
level of greenhouse gas emissions resulting from a
global tax regime without adaptation (policy scenario
a in table 1). These levels are compared with the
emission allowances resulting from two different
emission allocation schemes: one in which mitigation
costs as share of GDP are equalized (policy scenario c
in table 1, ﬁgure S1 top panel), and one in which total
climate change costs as share of GDP are equalized
(policy scenario d in table 1, ﬁgure S1 middle panel).
Both allocation schemes assume a well-functioning
global cap-and-trade system.
Figure 3, left panel, shows the difference between
the two emission allocation schemes, illustrating the
net effect of including adaptation and impact costs in
the burden accounting. The right panel illustrates the
impacts on the ﬁnancial transfers associated with
emission allocation trading in a well-functioning glo-
bal carbon market. Positive net exports represent the
value of the emission allowance sold (exported) in the
trading scheme, whereas negative net exports repre-
sent the value of the emission allowance purchased
(imported). Red and blue rectangular areas can be
directly mapped into the regions located in quadrant
III + IV and II + I in ﬁgure 2, respectively. Regions
marked in yellow show ambiguous results acrossmod-
els. These are the regions that generally collocate
across quadrants in ﬁgure 2 (Europe, Latin America,
Middle East) because the two models make different
assumptions on climate impacts and adaptation costs.
The magnitude of changes in emission allocation
is generally larger for FAIR because FAIR projects
lower mitigation costs than WITCH (see section S4
and tables S16). FAIR estimates the direct cost of miti-
gation as the area under Marginal Abatement Cost
curves (MACs) of the abatement options used.
WITCH measures the indirect costs of climate policy
as change in GDP or consumption after investments
Figure 2.Residual damage plus adaptation costs (vertical axis) andmitigation costs (horizontal axis) relative to the global average in
Net Present Value (2005–2100) calculatedwith a 3%discount factor under two global tax regimes (2 °CTax, 3 °CTax)without
climate change damages. Dashed lines divide the charts in four quadrants (I,II,II,IV) identifying cases above and below the global
average costs.
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have been allocated in a cost-effective way to low-car-
bon options. MIPs have shown that differences in
model structures and assumptions signiﬁcantly affect
models’ cost estimates of climate policy targets (van
Vuuren et al 2009, Paltsev and Capros 2013, Blanford
et al 2014)9. MAC-based cost indicators give lower
estimates of policy costs than macroeconomic indica-
tors because consumption and GDP include the mac-
roeconomic feedback of changes in the energy system
(Paltsev and Capros 2013, Tavoni et al 2013). FAIR
and WITCH are almost on opposite ends of the spec-
trum, with FAIR estimating lower costs, though the
variation in both absolute costs and regional differ-
ences is within the range of uncertainty as identiﬁed by
the IPCC 5th assessment report (Clarke et al 2014). As
a consequence, the share of residual damages and
adaptation costs in the total costs of climate change is
larger in FAIR than in WITCH, leading to a stronger
net effect of adding residual damages and adaptation
costs to the burden accounting. Differences in mitiga-
tion costs are smaller in the 3 °C policy scenario, and
this is reﬂected in the reduced range displayed in
ﬁgure 3. Large differences in quantities are compen-
sated by higher carbon price estimates in the WITCH
model, leading to similar changes inﬁnancial values.
Results on how the emission allowance allocation
would need to change depend on the level of
mitigation cost compared to residual damages and
adaptation costs (ﬁgure 2), carbon price estimates, and
the trading position on the global carbon market (SI
section 4, for a discussion). Discrepancies between
change in allocation and ﬁnancial values are due to
concurrent changes in allocation and allowance price
when residual damages and adaptation costs are inclu-
ded. Consider Middle East and Latin America in 2050.
Small increases in the allocation of allowances can
translate into ambiguous results in terms of ﬁnancial
ﬂows because including climate impact cost compo-
nents into the analysis can lead to a moderate reduc-
tion in the carbon price in 2050, which occurs in the
WITCHmodel.
Unambiguous results can be identiﬁed for the
remaining regions. Relatively high-damage countries
would be entitled to additional emission allowances as
compensation, compared to an emission allocation
equating only mitigation costs. Under the 2 °C policy,
the monetary value of these additional allowances
could reach about $523-566 billion in 2050 (which is
33%–36% more than the equal mitigation cost
regime), with the following regional distribution,
India ($316-333 billion in 2050), Africa ($107-131 bil-
lion in 2050), and Rest of Asia ($76-126 billion in
2050). The additional ﬁnancial ﬂows related to the net
exports of emission allowances are relatively insensi-
tive to the temperature targets, although the 3 °C tar-
get would entail somewhat higher ﬁnancial transfers
to compensate for the larger residual climate damages
and adaptation costs in developing countries. The
relative insensitivity is due to the small difference in
temperature change between the climate target sce-
narios by 2050.
A core group of low-impact regions, China, the
United States, and Paciﬁc OECD, would be buying the
Figure 3.The left panel shows the change in emission allocation between the equal total cost regime (policy scenario d) and the equal
mitigation cost regime (policy scenario c). The right panel shows the change in theﬁnancial transfers associatedwith emission
allocation trading between scenarios d and c. Financial transfers represent the value of emission allowances net exports. Positive
(negative)net exports represent the value of the emission allowances sold (purchased) in the trading scheme. The colored rectangular
areas identify the regions inwhich the change in emission allocation or in net exports increases (blue), decreases (red), is ambiguous
(yellow).
9
Other factors explaining differences in regional cost estimates
include baseline assumptions about socio-economic dynamics and
baseline emissions, which determine the regional relative abatement
effort, regional characteristics such as fuel mix, fossil energy trade
exposure, energy intensity, and the availability and extent of low
carbon energy resources, and technology costs, all of which differ
between the models (Tavoni et al 2013). Of particular importance
when considering low stabilization targets are assumptions related
to negative emission technologies, land use and non-CO2 emissions
(Blanford et al 2014).
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additional emission allowances from high-impact
regions under the scheme equating total climate costs.
In terms of total ﬁnancial transfers compensating for
all costs of climate change, mitigation, residual
damages, and adaptation, North America, Paciﬁc
OECD, and Europe would still remain the major buy-
ers of emission allocations (ﬁgure S2, top panel).
4.Discussion
Most quantitative studies on effort-sharing focus only
on the equity regarding mitigation costs. In the
negotiations on international climate policy, however,
also the unequal distribution of climate impacts and
adaptation measures plays a role. The scarcity of
consistent estimates of climate impacts and adaptation
costs at the national and regional scale with world
coverage has limited the ability of IAMs to provide
integrated assessment of equity issues. While earlier
studies provided some insights into this question, here
we also address the role of uncertainty by using two
IAMs equipped with different damage and adaptation
cost functions to investigate the regional distribution
of mitigation, adaptation, and damage costs resulting
from climate change policies and determine how
unequal total climate change costs can be compen-
sated by trading emission allowances in a global cap-
and-trade scheme. Our multi-model analysis high-
lights the key factors inﬂuencing the results as well as
the outcomes with respect to the regional distribution
holding across a set of key uncertainties.
The results show that in both models a 3 °C cli-
mate goal leaves considerable residual impacts and
adaptation costs. The adaptation challenge is smaller
with a 2 °C goal, but residual damages and adaptation
costs remain high enough to induce a considerable
reallocation of emission allowances. The allowance
allocation equalizing the total burden of climate
change as share of GDP would differ substantially
from the allocation equating only mitigation costs.
Despite model differences, unambiguous results can
be identiﬁed for the regions showing a clear ranking in
terms of relative mitigation, adaptation, and climate
impact costs. Should adaptation costs and residual
damages be included in the burden to be shared, high-
impact regions would receive more emission allowan-
ces. Compared to the emission allocation equating
only mitigation costs, additional ﬁnancial resources
totaling to $523–566 billion in 2050 would ﬂow to the
high-impact countries in Africa, the rest of Asia, and in
India through the sales of emission allowances in the
carbon market in both climate scenarios. Less clear
results emerge for the regions whose ranking in terms
of relative impacts or mitigation costs varies across
models.
The results of the present study should not be con-
sidered as the deﬁnitive costs and equitable ﬁnancial
transfers or emissions allowance allocations, but
rather as an initial estimate that serves to highlight the
key factors inﬂuencing equity, how shifts in expected
costs will inﬂuence equitable distributions, and to
advance thinking on the topic of equity in global
responses to climate change.Moreover, results assume
a global cap-and-trade system being in place from
2020 onwards, which is not easy to implement in the
real world and does not seem in line with the current
bottom-up process. Given the signiﬁcant equity reper-
cussions and the remaining uncertainty in damage and
adaptation cost estimates, our analysis points to the
need to further joint assessments of mitigation and
adaptation policies. Several projects and initiatives are
developing new aggregate regional estimates of adap-
tation costs and impacts at the scale that is relevant for
IAMs10 that could be used in future integrated assess-
ments andMIP exercises.
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